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A COMMENT ON ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 
JOEL SELIGMAN* 
This is a hard time for business.  But, on the stage tonight are two men 
who represent integrity at its finest in our financial and business community.  
No institutional investor spokesman has been more consistent in demanding 
the highest standards from auditors than John Biggs.  Before and after the 
Enron debacle, John articulated tough positions on such issues as auditor 
rotation or the division of auditing from management advisory services.  In 
taking these positions, he spoke as a business statesman. 
John Bachmann is an individual who is nationally recognized as one of the 
great figures in the broker-dealer community.  He is the managing partner of 
Edward Jones, which is among the most respected corporations in the country.  
It is a firm with an extraordinary compliance record.  Those who doubt 
business should be in the audience tonight, because they would hear 
individuals who adhere to the highest ethical standards, and practice what they 
preach. 
John Biggs, in his eloquent remarks, referred to this as a “hangover 
decade.”  We have seen the bubble burst and all of us, one way or another, are 
paying a price for it.  There is no question that there is a degree of self-
correction currently occurring.  Boards will be more scrupulous, auditors will 
say no, the SEC is about to receive a substantial infusion of staff that may 
increase its staff by as much as 800 individuals.1  The Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), which was authorized in July 2002 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,2 has the potential to be a powerful 
augmentation to the SEC in its review process and particularly in its inspection 
of auditors and its enforcement efforts.  We are unlikely during the first years 
of our current decade to see the type of systemic failures in the business 
community that we witnessed during the 1990s. 
I want to address issues that will become significant once the pendulum 
starts swinging the other way.  In terms of public policy, largely unaddressed 
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 1. Bloomberg News, Key Senator Backs SEC’s $841.5-Million Budget, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES 4 (Apr. 9, 2003). 
 2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
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by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, are three issues that will be of signal importance in 
the years to come. 
First is the structure of the auditing profession.  There are approximately 
13,000 corporations that register with the SEC under the Securities Exchange 
Act.3  About ninety percent of these firms currently are audited by four 
auditing firms.4  To say there are four, however, overstates how few there 
really are.  In some industries, there are only two or three that are viewed as 
having relevant expertise.  During my professional lifetime, I have witnessed a 
steady decline from the Big Eight to the Big Six, the Big Five, and now the 
Final Four.  Why are there so few?  Why do new auditors not enter the top 
segment of the industry?  What is it about auditing that has made it an industry 
of seemingly impenetrable entry barriers? 
To some degree, the conventional wisdom today focuses on the cross-
subsidy of audit services by management advisory services.  That is to say the 
Big Four allegedly charge relatively low auditing costs and make much of their 
income by providing management advisory services to the clients.  To some 
degree, there is an international dimension to this — there has been a growth in 
the geographic scope of leading auditing firm.  Would our country be better 
served by more auditing firms for public companies?  Would our country be 
better served by an industry in which competition to provide the highest 
quality audit services allowed new entrants?  That is a question that is 
addressed only indirectly in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by a section that requires 
a study.5  The study will be completed later this year, an appropriate time for 
the SEC and the PCAOB to focus on the structure of the auditing profession.  
Few topics are of greater potential significance to the auditing profession than 
its structure.  Beyond the normative question — should efforts be made to 
increase the number of major public auditing firms — are complex questions 
of mechanics.  How could such a restructuring occur?  Would it be financially 
viable?  How would it relate to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s partial separation of 
auditing and management advisory services?6 
Second, we live in a domestic economy that is more involved in a 
transnational economy.  To a much greater extent than few decades ago, when 
Americans owned relatively little foreign investment and foreigners owned 
very little international stock, securities trading now crosses borders.  Paul 
Volcker, the current Chair of the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), leads an effort to address the question: Will the world economy better 
 
 3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2001). 
 4. Bernard Wolfman, “Sarbanes-Oxley” Needs Fixing, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/s74902/bwolfman1.txt. 
 5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 701. 
 6. 98 U.S.C. 15 § 1701 (2003); Pub. L. 107-204, Title VII, § 701, 116 Stat. 797 (July 30, 
2002). 
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be served by harmonization of United States accounting standards with those 
throughout the leading securities markets in the world?  It is a question that the 
SEC has long viewed warily.  Our disclosure requirements, including our 
accounting standards, long were regarded as the most rigorous in the world.7 
The IASB, however, recently preceded the Financial Accounting Standard 
Board to require the expensing of stock options, and it served notice that an 
international body can be more rigorous than the United States in its disclosure 
standards.8  This prompts the question: Are we moving toward a more global 
economy in which the essence of security trading will be to have a top tier of 
securities simultaneously capable of being issued and traded in multiple 
countries throughout the world under similar or identical standards?  This is a 
question that, in a time of corporate scandal, has received relatively little 
attention.  It was an issue that the current Chair of the SEC, William 
Donaldson, put on the table in the early 1990s when he was Chairman of the 
New York Stock Exchange and focused on listing standards applicable to 
international issues.9  Inevitably, as our economy becomes more bound up in a 
global economy, we will face a day in which the need for the harmonization of 
domestic and international standards may require some compromise in 
domestic standards.  The question we will face then is whether we can still 
insist upon standards sufficiently rigorous to protect United States’ investors 
while simultaneously protecting the ability of United States corporations to 
effectively sell securities throughout the world. 
Finally, I want to address an explicit theme that both John Biggs and John 
Bachmann addressed.  John Biggs, in his allusion to Galbraith’s The Great 
Crash,10 depicted not merely a financial crisis, but a moral one.  The 
deterioration of ethical standards in the 1920s was the subtext of the great 
crash.  We have recently seen a similar deterioration in ethical standards in 
corporate governance and in auditing firms.  Decades ago, auditors were 
symbols of integrity.  They became far flashier during the 1980s and 1990s, as 
their profession gravitated from auditing financial statements to increasingly 
providing management advisory services.  By 2000, management advisory 
services provided approximately fifty percent of the income of the Big Five 
accounting firms at a time when auditing accounted for about thirty percent.11  
 
 7. Douglas Flint, A Passion for Clarity: IAS 39 Is In the Front Line of the Conflict Pitting 
Principles Against Rules, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 6, 2003, at 2. 
 8. Cassell Bryan-Low & Silvia Ascarelli, Proposal to Treat Options as Costs Will Be Laid 
Out, WALL ST. J. Nov. 7, 2002, at C16. 
 9. Cheryl Beth Strauss, Do U.S. Investors Need More Foreign Listings?; The SEC Says It 
Won’t Fix What Is Already Working, But The NYSE Says It’s Not Working Well Enough, 
INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIG., Nov. 9, 1992, at 16, 16. 
 10. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH (1929). 
 11. Joanne Rockness & Susan Ivancevich, et al., Auditor Independence: A Bit More Rope, 
available at http://www.fei.org/magaziene/articles/1-2-2001_auditing.cfm. 
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This was a business model that implicitly characterized auditing less as the 
backbone of audit firms and more as a loss leader. 
The recovery of the moral posture of what was, and should be, a great 
profession requires us to focus again, fundamentally, on auditing.  There is a 
hunger right now, not only in corporate boardrooms, but also in the new 
management, that has emerged in the leading audit firms for a profession that 
will be respected.  This is a potential evolution that will require the auditing 
profession to recognize that the profession relies on the confidence and 
integrity that investors and business corporations have in their audits.  For the 
audit profession to be, in fact, a profession, means it needs a new model — one 
less reliant on highly profitable services that are derivative of auditing and 
more focused on what for so long the audit profession did so well. 
 
